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I. INTRODUCTION
For the first time in several decades, across the United States, we stand at a
moment of critical appraisal of our practice of capital punishment. Suddenly, in
the past few years, concern and caution about the use of the death penalty have
moved from the fringes to the center of public discourse-in universities, in the
media, and perhaps most significantly in the federal and state legislatures.
Signs of this sea-change are all around us: from Republican Governor George
Ryan's moratorium on executions in Illinois following the exoneration of more
than a dozen death-row inmates in his state,' to New Hampshire's attempted
repeal of its own death penalty statute (a repeal passed by the legislature but
vetoed by Democratic Governor Jeanne Shaheen),2 to substantial dips in public
support for capital punishment nationwide as measured by polling data.' The
experience of Massachusetts, one of the twelve abolitionist states in which
reinstatement of capital punishment is regularly sought, is emblematic of both the
suddenness and the extent of the shift in public attitudes: in the last legislative
session three and a half years ago, the death penalty came within one vote of
reinstatement, 4 whereas the most recent effort in March of 2001 failed by the wide
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' See Ken Armstrong & Steve Mills, Ryan: 'Until I Can Be Sure'; Illinois Is First State to
Suspend Death Penalty, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 1,2000, at N1.
2 See N.H. Governor Vetoes Bill to Repeal the Death Penalty, CHI. TRIB., May 20, 2000,
at N3.
3See Gallup Poll News Service, Gallup Poll Topics: A-Z Death Penalty,
http://www.gallup.com/poll/indicators/inddeathpen.asp (last updated June 10, 2001). In May
2001, a Gallup poll revealed that public support for the death penalty had fallen to its lowest
level in nineteen years. As of May 2001, support for the death penalty had dropped fifteen
percentage points from its high in 1994 to a level of 65%. In addition, the same poll revealed
that, when those polled were given the alternative of life imprisonment without possibility of
parole, their support for the death penalty dropped to 52%, down from 61% in 1997. In a
February 2001 Gallup poll, 57% of those polled said they favored a moratorium on the death
penalty in all states with capital punishment schemes similar to the one currently in effect in
Illinois.
4 Actually, the Massachusetts House briefly passed a bill approving reinstatement, but one
state representative changed his mind and his vote soon thereafter, apparently as a result of the
outcome of the Louise Woodward trial. See Adrian Walker & Doris Sue Wong, No Death
Penalty, By One Vote, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 7, 1997, at Al.
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margin of 92-60 in the Massachusetts House.'
Even more commonly, in state legislative committees, bills to "reform" death
penalty procedures proliferate on draffing tables, offering everything from
mandatory DNA preservation and testing, to improved representation in capital
cases, to limitations on the execution of juveniles and persons with mental
retardation.6 Other reforms include Ohio's proposal to replace the existing
"beyond a reasonable doubt" standard with a "beyond any doubt" standard in
capital cases, Indiana's proposal to limit judicial overrides of non-death verdicts,
North Carolina's proposal to allow trial judges to block the state from seeking the
death penalty if a judge determines that race was the primary reason prosecutors
sought the death penalty, and several states' proposals to add life without
possibility of parole as a third alternative to death and life with possibility of
parole.' In addition, many states have proposed extensive studies of the death
penalty, with some states calling for a moratorium on executions until results
from such studies can be evaluated.8
As committed abolitionists ourselves, we see cause for celebration in these
developments. But as students of past movements for abolition in the United
States, we see some cause for concern as well. To state our concern in perhaps the
most provocative way, we worry that reforming our current practices of capital
punishment may be analogous to replacing the electric chair with lethal injection;
the reformed practice is unquestionably better (fairer, more humane) than the one
rejected, but the choice to reform also carries the distinct possibility that it will
normalize the underlying practice and avert the very critical gaze that gave rise to
the reforming impulse, thus delaying, or even permanently preventing, full-scale
abolition of capital punishment.
In our past work,9 we have argued that such a normalizing effect was the
5See Erin C. McVeigh, Death Penalty Bill Soundly Defeated, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 13,
2001, at 134.6 See generally Death Penalty Information Center, Changes in the Death Penalty Around
the US. 2000-2001 (July 1, 2001), at http//www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/Changes.html. In Ohio,
H.B. 101 would prohibit the death penalty unless the defendant is convicted of aggravated
murder beyond any doubt and the aggravating circumstances are found to outweigh any
mitigating factors beyond any doubt. Id. In Indiana, H.B. 1679 would prohibit judges from
overriding juries to impose a death sentence without a unanimous jury recommendation. Id. It
passed out of the Courts and Criminal Code Committee in the House by a 7-6 vote. In North
Carolina, the Racial Justice Act (H.B. 140, S.B. 171) would prohibit the imposition of the death
penalty based on race and would require a judge to determine whether race was the primary
reason prosecutors decided to seek the death penalty against a defendant. Id. Also in North
Carolina, S.B. 172 calls for a moratorium on executions while a study of the fairness of capital
punishment is completed. Id.7 Id.
81d.
9 See Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections on Two
Decades of Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, 109 HARV. L. REv. 355 (1995).
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result of our one previous reforming moment-the attempt to abolish or reform
capital punishment through litigation that was spear-headed by the NAACP Legal
Defense Fund in the 1960s and early 1970s. The abolitionist litigators achieved
their goal temporarily in 1972 with the Supreme Court's decision in Furman v.
Georgia0 striking down state capital punishment schemes as impermissibly
arbitrary. What was thought at the time to be abolition, however, turned out to be
only a moratorium. Four years later in 1976, the Supreme Court chose the path of
regulation rather than abolition with its decisions in Gregg v. Georgia" and four
companion cases, holding that the Eighth Amendment imposed various
procedural requirements on the death penalty's administration but permitted its
continued use. Over the last twenty-five years, the Court has elaborated on this
reformist vision of constitutional regulation of capital punishment.
We assessed the Court's reformist project on its own terms, asking whether
the Court achieved the goals explicit or implicit in Furman and the 1976
foundational cases. Our assessment was not a positive one. Although the
reformist approach spawned an extraordinarily intricate and detailed capital
punishment jurisprudence, the resulting doctrines were in practical terms largely
unresponsive to the underlying concerns for fairness and heightened reliability
that had first led to the constitutional regulation of the death penalty. We
described contemporary capital punishment law as the worst of all possible
worlds. Its sheer complexity led to numerous reversals of death sentences and
thus imposed substantial costs on state criminal justice systems. On closer
inspection, however, the complexity concealed the minimalist nature of the
Court's reforms, which tolerated, if not invited, the inequalities and
capriciousness characteristic of the pre-Furman era.
We also argued that, apart from its failure on its own terms, the Supreme
Court's reformist regulation of capital punishment might well have carried an
additional unanticipated cost. Whereas abolitionists initially sought judicial
regulation of the death penalty as at least a first step towards abolition, judicial
reform actually may have helped to stabilize the death penalty as a social practice.
We argued that the appearance of intensive regulation of state death penalty
practices, notwithstanding its virtual absence, played a role in legitimizing the
practice of capital punishment in the eyes of actors both within and outside the
criminal justice system, and we pointed to some objective indicators-such as the
dramatic decline in the use of executive clemency in the post-Furman era' 2-as
10 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
" 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
12 See Michael Korengold et al., And Justice for Few: The Collapse of the Capital
Clemency System in the United States, 20 HAMLINE L. REv. 349, 350 (1996) (documenting that
between 1960 and 1970, 261 people were executed and 204 people were granted clemency,
while between 1985 and 1995, 281 people were executed and only 20 people were granted
clemency); Michael Radelet & Barbara Zsembik, Executive Clemency in Post-Furman Capital
Cases, 27 U. RICH. L. REv. 289, 304 (1993) (concluding that the decline in the use of clemency
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support for this thesis.
Today, perhaps not surprisingly, 3 we find ourselves in a moment not
dissimilar to the one that immediately preceded Funnan and its progeny. A
confluence of events has worked to undermine the appearance of extensive,
effective judicial reform of the death penalty. In response to the Oklahoma City
bombing, Congress quite visibly limited the scope of federal collateral review of
state criminal convictions, promising in the title of the act a more "effective death
penalty" through lessened judicial interference.' 4 At the same time, post-trial
investigations revealed numerous death-sentenced inmates in Illinois and
elsewhere who were in fact innocent, or very likely innocent, of the underlying
capital offenses with which they had been charged.15 As a result, the popular
critical scrutiny of contemporary death penalty practices that virtually disappeared
during the two-decade period of judicial reform following Furman has
dramatically reappeared. Not surprisingly, given the quite different character of
the current Supreme Court from the Warren Court of the 1960s, much of the
critical energy is now directed toward executive and primarily legislative reform
rather than judicial reform.' 6
powers has exacerbated the capriciousness of the death penalty that Furman sought to mitigate
and demonstrates the failure of state executives to ensure that only the most blameworthy and
irredeemable defendants are executed).
"3 Indeed, we predicted something like this latest swing of the pendulum in an earlier
essay:
As the most visible signs of contemporary regulation are withdrawn, actors within the
criminal justice system will no longer be able to indulge the comforting presumption that
their decisions and actions are rendered less significant or meaningful by "extensive"
checks elsewhere established. And if the numbers of those sentenced to death and
executed climb, the general public might revisit the fairness and reliability issues
surrounding state death penalty practices that first surfaced three decades ago ... Just as
there is irony in the stabilization of the death penalty by its reformers, so would there be
irony if the success of death penalty proponents were to lead a new generation to re-
examine the justice of the death penalty.
Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Judicial Developments in Capital Punishment Law, in
AMERICA'S EXPERIMENT WITH CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 71 (James R. Acker et al. eds., 1998).
14 See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, Pub. L. No. 104-132, §104, 1996
U.S.C.A.A.N. (110 Stat.) 1218-19 (codified in 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1996)) (limiting the
availability of habeas corpus review of state criminal convictions).
15 See Ken Armstrong & Steve Mills, Death Row Justice Derailed: Bias, Errors and
Incompetence in Capital Cases Have Turned Illinois' Harshest Punishment Into Its Least
Credible, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 14, 1999, at Cl. This was the first article in a five-part investigative
report entitled The Failure of the Death Penalty in Illinois that appeared in the Chicago Tribune
from November 14, 1999 to November 18, 1999. The series examined and found serious flaws
in the 285 death-penalty cases in Illinois since capital punishment was reinstated in that state in
1977.
16 The Supreme Court is attempting to re-enter the picture by granting certiorari in cases
involving death-sentenced inmates with mental retardation. Its first grant, in McCarver v. North
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Our central question is whether the dynamic of legitimation we observed and
described in the context of judicial reform is of equal concern in the context of
legislative reform. Although reform through legislation differs in some important
respects from reform through constitutional adjudication, we believe that
legislative reform poses some of the same problems of legitimation that were
realized through judicial reform. On the one hand, reformers might well believe
that the reforms they urge-such as more DNA testing in capital cases, better
capital defense representation, or the categorical exclusion of juveniles or the
mentally retarded from the ambit of capital punishment, to name just a few of the
currently proposed reforms-will make the administration of the death penalty
fairer, more reliable, or simply narrower in scope, and therefore unquestionably
good in and of itself On the other hand, the experience we have observed and
described with judicial reform of capital punishment suggests that such reforms
may also have the effect of dissipating critical scrutiny of death penalty practices
by making participants in, and observers of, those practices more comfortable
than they ought to be, or at least more comfortable than they otherwise would be,
with the underlying practice of capital punishment.
Hence, we arrive at the question that forms the title of this paper: "Should
abolitionists support legislative reform of the death penalty?" Of course,
abolitionists are of many stripes: some base their opposition on religious or moral
grounds, others base their opposition on the impossibility of structuring
sufficiently fair and reliable administration of capital punishment in our current
society and our extant criminal justice system, and yet others base their opposition
simply on the lack of necessity for the death penalty, given the lack of compelling
proof that it serves as a viable deterrent. Abolitionists from these three general
camps, or abolitionists with other, more particular concerns, might well have
different responses to the array of potential legislative reforms currently on the
table. And yet, any person who continues to believe that the practice of capital
punishment should be abandoned even if the proposed reforms are implemented
must at least consider the possible legitimating effect of such reforms.
IX. LEGITIMATION AND ENTRENCHMENT
A vast social and political literature attempts to understand the relation
between popular attitudes about social institutions and the stability of such
institutions. What beliefs, for example, contribute to law-abidingness? What sorts
of ideologies help stabilize societies that are beset with inequality? How are those
ideologies "produced" or "transmitted"? Our project focuses more modestly on
particular beliefs about a particular institution. What views does the public
Carolina, 532 U.S. 941 (2001), resulted in the case being dismissed as moot after the state
legislature passed a law prohibiting the execution of persons with mental retardation. The Court
simultaneously granted certiorari in Atkins v. Virginia, 122 S. Ct. 24 (2001) for argument and
decision during the October 2001 Term.
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entertain about the accuracy and fairness of the death penalty, and how does the
"law," in the form of legislative decisionmaking, contribute to those views?
Public attitudes about the death penalty undoubtedly affect its continued
viability. The last moment of significant public disquiet concerning the death
penalty, in the late 1960s, brought us close to judicial abolition as the Court
sought to gauge "evolving standards of decency., 17 With this in mind, we attempt
to assess the effect of legislative reforms on public attitudes by looking at two
possible dynamics, legitimation and entrenchment.
There are at least two ways, we argue, in which legislative reform of the
death penalty could legitimate the practice of capital punishment. The first is
virtually identical to the kind of legitimation we described as a by-product of
judicial reform of the death penalty-that is, some reforms may do very little to
change the underlying practice but may offer the appearance of much greater
procedural regularity than they actually produce, thus inducing a false or
exaggerated belief in the fairness of the entire system of capital punishment. This
sense of legitimation borrows from the social theories of Max Weber and Antonio
Gramsci and differs from the other, perhaps more commonly used, senses of the
verb "to legitimate." The dictionary's two primary definitions of legitimation do
not (necessarily) involve the inducement of false or exaggerated belief. Rather,
they refer, respectively, to the formal process of authorization (as in "the Supreme
Court legitimated an act of Congress by upholding it against constitutional
challenge") 8 or to the dynamic of actually providing true legitimacy (as in "the
Supreme Court's documentation of coercive police interrogation techniques
legitimated its conclusion that Miranda warnings were necessary to prevent
involuntary confessions").' 9 Weber's idea of legitimation, unlike these formal and
normative conceptions, focuses on an individual's (or a group's) experience or
belief in the normative legitimacy of a social phenomenon, such as a set of
relationships, a form of organization, or an ongoing custom or practice, whatever
might "really" be the case. °
Popular support for the death penalty depends crucially on the perception that
those sentenced to death and executed are in fact guilty of the underlying offense.
Historically, concerns about this sort of accuracy have loomed large in several
nations' movements to abolish the death penalty. In England, for example, high-
profile cases involving wrongful executions were at the center of the debates
leading to abolition by Parliament. In this country as well, the possibility of
executing innocents seems to arouse the greatest opposition to the death penalty.
The new "moment" in American death penalty politics is commonly traced back
to the discovery of erroneous convictions in Illinois, and polling data reflects the
7 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (Warren, C.J., plurality opinion).
18 WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1291 (1986) (first definition).
'9 Id. (second definition).
20 This was Weber's own description of his special sense of legitimation. See MAX
WEBER, BASIC CONCEPTS IN SOCIOLOGY 72-73 (H.P. Secher trans., 1962).
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priority of this concern in shaping public attitudes toward the death penalty.
Not surprisingly, many of the proposed reforms are designed to reduce the
possibility of executing the innocent. These reforms risk legitimating in the
Weberian sense, because they might foster an unjustified confidence in our ability
to avoid such errors. Take, for example, the proposal to raise the burden of proof
in a capital case from "beyond a reasonable doubt" to "beyond any doubt." While
it is true that standards of proof can and do matter throughout the law, it is also
literally true that no verdict is "beyond any doubt," especially when, as Ohio's
proposal would have it, that standard would apply to the ultimate question
whether aggravating factors outweigh mitigating factors. This new standard of
review might in fact encourage a level of care not already present in capital
deliberations, but more likely it will be proclaimed by supporters of the death
penalty as significant insurance against error (and indeed might chill later
decisionmakers from fairly second-guessing the jury's conclusions).
Another potentially legitimating reform, and perhaps currently the most
popular propogal nationwide, concerns DNA testing. It goes without saying that
prosecutors should not destroy (and should be required to maintain and test)
potentially exculpatory physical evidence in capital cases. But this reform is of
extremely limited applicability, because actual innocence will be provable based
on the presence of DNA at the crime scene for few capital crimes (apart from
those involving rape, and not even all of those). However, the proponents of DNA
reforms and the general public seem to overestimate wildly the extent of the
safety net such reforms can provide against wrongful convictions. More
generally, DNA evidence at most will establish an offender's guilt or innocence
but often will tell us little about whether a particular defendant should receive the
death penalty. Like the "beyond all doubt" reform, DNA preservation and testing
reforms send a message of certainty that does not correspond to the actual
reliability they can plausibly secure.
Other reforms might legitimate because they are precisely intended to quell
public criticism while preserving the objectionable practice that the reform
purports to address. In Texas, for example, prosecutors were highly influential in
shaping legislation that would have exempted persons with mental retardation
from the death penalty. Under the proposed law, the determination of whether an
offender has mental retardation would not be made before trial or by a judge, but
by the jury after it has concluded that the defendant should be put to death.2' The
transparent goals of this proposal were to ensure that the factual question of
whether an offender is mentally retarded would be clouded by the jury's moral
outrage toward the crime and to encourage a form of jury nullification. At the
same time, the message to the public at large would have been that Texas does
not allow for the execution of persons with mental retardation, even if, as a
21 Christy Hoppe, Texas Governor Vetoes Ban on Executing Retarded, DALLAS MORNING
NEWS, June 18, 2001, at IA.
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practical matter, such persons would not have been protected.22
The second form of legitimation, which was implicated to a lesser degree by
judicial reform, is the legitimation inherent in every kind of incremental change.
That is, even when reform does not induce a false or exaggerated belief in the
progress being made, it will always induce at least some satisfaction in the real
improvements achieved, and thus, will make people more comfortable than they
otherwise would be with the underlying practice, thereby dissipating continued
scrutiny of the death penalty and energy toward abolition. This effect might better
be called "entrenchment" rather than "legitimation." Noting entrenchment effects
is a familiar leftist critique of all plans for incremental reform, particularly in the
legal academy where the "legal process" school is often pitted against the school
of "critical legal theory" in such debates. Versions of this concern have been
raised in many other contexts, such as the racial equality, feminist, and labor
rights movements, to name just a few.
In other words, to ask whether abolitionists should support legislative reform
of the death penalty is to ask whether any real improvement that might be
achieved in the fairness, reliability, humanity, or scope of our system of capital
punishment outweighs the potential legitimating or entrenching effect of such
reforms. We thus mean to raise the very real fear that reform of capital
punishment and its abolition do not lie along the same track; rather, we worry that
reform may actually lead us away from abolition, toward a future where the death
penalty remains a stable and accepted part of our criminal justice system.
While we feel that it is critically important to voice this fear and at least raise
the question whether abolitionists should support legislative reform of the death
penalty, we find it difficult, and not even particularly helpful, to try to answer this
question absolutely in the abstract. After all, any answer must depend on precisely
what is on the table in the way of reform. Only then can the potential for real
change be weighed against the likelihood of legitimation and entrenchment. Thus,
our more particular project, in addition to simply raising the possibility that
reform might be the enemy of abolition, is to try to assess whether all reforms are
created equal in terms of their likely legitimating or entrenching effect. We
suspect that they are not, and we propose that it is a worthwhile project for
abolitionists to look for and to worry about the possible legitimating effects of
particular reforms and also to try to identify reforms that might counter
entrenchment by creating continued opportunities for critical scrutiny of capital
punishment.
22 Id. After the legislature passed the prosecutors' bill, the Texas Governor vetoed it on the
ground that the law was unnecessary and that persons with mental retardation had adequate
protection under existing law.
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I. COUNTERING LEGITIMATION AND ENTRENCHMENT: MODES OF
REFORM
As noted above, further work in sociological theory and empirical research
on how public perceptions of legitimacy (or illegitimacy) are created and
sustained would be of substantial relevance to our project. However, quite apart
from the abstractions and generalizations of theory, our project also calls for
careful study of particulars. Abolitionists could and should engage in nuanced,
case-by-case analysis of the legitimating or entrenching potential of each
proposed legislative reform to each of the various state and federal capital
schemes currently in use. This sort of analysis will no doubt be informed both by
the particular locale in which the reform is being proposed (that is, its particular
concerns and politics) and by the precise reform being advanced. The promotion
of this sort of analysis plausibly could be, by itself, the normative, "bottom-line"
answer to the question we pose in our title. However, we also seek to identify
categories of reforms that seem to hold the promise of countering or reducing the
legitimating or entrenching potential of the reformist project as a whole. We
believe that there are at least three general categories that, for different reasons,
seem to hold such promise.
The first general category of non-entrenching reform is one that we call
institution-building reform. As all would-be reformers of anything know,
organization is everything. Organizations permit specialization of function within
the organization, growth and learning over time, and the ability to leverage small
numbers and meager resources into disproportionate political impact. While
death-penalty abolitionists tend to be intensely committed, they also tend to form
a rather diffuse collection of otherwise distinct and even disparate individuals and
organizations-ranging from religious groups, to human rights advocates, to
criminal justice insiders. Reforms creating new institutions that might serve as
focal points for abolitionist activity would be the kind of reforms that keep on
reforming by creating the means to channel present and future abolitionist energy
and information.
Of course, the creation of new institutions does not itself actually do anything
to counter the potentially legitimating effects of reform: it does not challenge any
erroneous assumptions that might emerge from the reformation process, and it
does not necessarily disseminate information or touch the public directly. Rather,
new institutions are vehicles for whatever form of abolitionist work the institution
is best suited to do, whether it be public education, information gathering,
lobbying, litigation, etc. The word "vehicle" is particularly apt here, because it has
two primary synonyms, which have two slightly different meanings, both of
which we mean to capture here. The first primary synonym for vehicle is
carrier," as in "an agent of transmission. Institutions provide the means to
23 WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1307 (1985).
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carry or transmit information and ideas. Because the effects of legitimation and
entrenchment are at the level of perception, institutions are crucial to the task of
countering those effects by their ability to serve as effective transmitters of
alternative ways of thinking. The second primary synonym for vehicle is
"conveyance" as in "motor vehicle. 24 This sort of vehicle moves from place to
place. What we mean to capture by our use of the word is not movement through
space but rather movement through time. Institutions that are created today will
still exist tomorrow or next year or maybe even ten or twenty years from now,
and thus they are one important way to invest in the future. Because reforming
capital punishment schemes today may well lead to reduced interest in abolition
tomorrow (or next year), it is important to "convey" some of today's abolitionist
energy to the future through the creation of new institutions.
There is a very real opportunity for this kind of institution-building reform in
the present death penalty context because of the almost universal
acknowledgment of the problem of inadequate capital defense counsel. The
substantial and even shocking documentation of the incompetence, indifference,
or both, of many capital defense lawyers25 has led to a variety of proposals aimed
at raising the minimum level of legal assistance provided in such cases. Reforms
currently being considered include raising salary caps for appointed counsel,
promulgating minimum competency tests, requiring minimum levels of prior
experience, requiring double chairing of capital trials, and establishing public
defender or specialized capital defender offices.26 Of these possible reforms, the
creation of specialized capital defender organizations has the institution-building
component that will intensify and magnify, rather than dissipate and diffuse,
abolitionist energy and activity. The lawyers who will be drawn to full-time,
minimally-compensated indigent capital defense work will be largely abolitionist
in their orientation and will likely see their role as collectors and disseminators of
abolitionist information and ideas as well as courtroom advocates for their clients.
Whether or not specialized capital defense organizations are the best way to
improve attorney competence-and the answer to this question might well vary
with the possible alternatives in a given locale-abolitionists should support the
creation of such organizations because of their unique capacity to counter the
legitimation and entrenchment effects of death penalty reform.27
24 Id.
21 See generally Stephen B. Bright, Neither Equal Nor Just: The Rationing and Denial of
Legal Services to the Poor When Life and Liberty Are at Stake, 1997 ANN. SUv. AM. L. 783;
Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor.- The Death Sentence Not for the Worst Crime But for
the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L. J. 1835 (1994).
26 See Death Penalty Information Center, supra note 6.
2' These hopes for specialized defender offices are based on more than mere speculation:
the federally funded Resource Centers played exactly such a role before they were de-funded in
1995, and Bryan Stephenson's Equal Justice Initiative in Alabama, which does a great deal of
capital litigation in a state without any public defense organization, currently plays a similar
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Of course, there are risks involved in creating new abolitionist institutions,
particularly institutions that provide capital defense services. In addition to being
an example of a capital defender service engaging in energetic abolitionist
activity, the federally-funded capital Resource Centers are also a cautionary tale.
Their de-funding came about precisely because they were viewed as too
abolitionist, and thus, capital defendants lost important litigation services in
addition to the more generally felt loss of an expert locus of abolitionist activity.
During the congressional de-funding process in 1995, South Carolina Attorney
General Charlie Condon captured the spirit of the ultimately successful opposition
to the public funding of the Resource Centers, saying, "[T]hese lawyers have
become lobbyists whose only goal is to stop executions at any cost.
28
Even if abolitionist activity does not eventually destroy public support for a
capital defender organization, the linking of abolitionist activity and legal
representation may undermine both activities. As lawyers, capital defenders may
feel conflicted about taking any energy away from their clients' often urgent cases
and thus, may not be able to undertake longer-term abolitionist projects that
would have no immediate impact for their current clients. And as abolitionists,
capital defenders may have little credibility, given that their clients clearly stand
to gain directly from abolition-a disability not faced by religious or human
rights organizations doing abolitionist work. Despite these caveats, which future
builders and leaders of any such new institutions would do well to heed, we
believe that institution-building-and, in particular, the building of specialized
capital defender institutions-seems like a particularly promising avenue of
counter-legitimation and entrenchment.
The second type of non-entrenching reform we call sunshine reform, or more
simply, data collection and dissemination. The collection of information that is
not available now, or only partially available, in our criminal justice system does
not in itself reform the current system; rather, it is specifically geared to the future.
In the death penalty context, there was a largely unsuccessful legislative move to
prohibit disparate racial impacts in the distribution of capital sentencing in the
wake of the Supreme Court's decision in McCleskey v. Kemp,29 which rejected
constitutional challenges to the use of capital punishment despite statistical
evidence demonstrating a correlation between the race of victims and defendants
(but mostly victims) and the likelihood of a death sentence.3° Only the state of
Kentucky actually passed any sort of "Racial Justice Act," despite many concerns
raised by the data reviewed in McCleskey and collected since. More recent studies
have also begun to show that the race ofjurors also plays a large role in predicting
role, performing grass-roots advocacy and information dissemination in addition to providing
litigation services.
28 Lis Wiehl, A Program for Death-Row Appeals is Facing Elimination, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
11, 1995, at Bl6.
29 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
'0 Id. at 279-82.
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capital verdicts. 31 Data collection in this context may well set the stage for further
reform or abolition of capital punishment. In particular, collecting data on the race
of jurors seated and struck in capital trials, even in the absence of a Batson32 or
McCollum 33 challenge would add significant information that is currently
unavailable in the criminal justice system regarding the racial composition of
capital juries. Similarly, collecting information on the race of defendants and their
victims in all cases eligible for a capital indictment would provide a fuller picture
than the one that is currently accessible. In addition to requiring the recording of
information that currently exists but is hard to access, new recording requirements
could actually create new information, such as requiring individual prosecutors to
give reasons for bringing, or declining to bring, a capital case. Requiring the
collection or the production of these kinds of information sets the stage for future
challenges to the use of capital punishment by giving future reformers some way
of measuring the success of current reforms. Moreover, sunshine reforms work
powerfully in conjunction with institution-building reforms because the new
institutions have the interest, the personnel, and the dissemination power to use
the information collected to generate and to focus critical scrutiny on continuing
problems in the administration of capital punishment.
Sunshine reforms will tend to counter the legitimating or entrenching effects
of reform only if the information brought to light in fact reveals continued
problems with the administration of capital punishment. It is possible that some
reforms really will make the system much better than it used to be and will render
it "good enough" for most people to accept without outrage. For example, a
recent study of the capital justice process in the state of Nebraska revealed no
statistically significant effect of the race of either the defendant or the victim on
the death sentencing or execution rate in the 177 homicide cases studied.34 The
lead editorial in the Omaha World-Herald blared: "Nebraska is Acquitted,"
35
despite the fact that the study showed a strong connection between the socio-
economic status of the victim and the defendant's chance of execution, as well as
substantial geographic disparities within the state in charging practices. Moreover,
in times like the present of heightened concern over capital punishment, it is
possible that the public may be under- as opposed to over-estimating the
reliability of the capital process. For example, it is our hunch that some, perhaps
many, members of the public would be surprised to learn that none of the many
capital defendants who have been exonerated by DNA evidence were actually
3 See William J. Bowers et al., Death Sentencing in Black and White: An Empirical
Analysis of the Role of Jurors'Race and Jury Racial Composition, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 171
(2001).
32 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
3' Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42 (1992).34 See Leslie Reed, Death-Penalty System Called Fair; Study Finds Race Doesn't Play
Significant Role in Sentencing, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, Aug. 2,2001, at 1.35See Nebraska is Acquitted, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, Aug. 2, 2001, at 18.
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executed. (The hunt for the scientifically proven "executed innocent" continues.)
Thus, sunshine reforms carry their own risks of legitimating and entrenching.
Our nomination of sunshine reforms for the short list of counter-legitimating
reforms is driven by our pessimistic, but informed, prediction that the gravest
problems afflicting our capital justice process-racial discrimination (conscious
and unconscious), class bias, inadequate criminal defense counsel, and
prosecutorial and/or judicial misconduct-will not easily be eliminated, or even
substantially mitigated, in most venues. If we are right, then sunshine is crucial to
the abolitionist project, as another recent news story illustrates. Less than a week
after the Nebraska report was carried on the front page of the Omaha World-
Herald, the Seattle Post-Intelligencer ran its own front-page story on the failure of
capital defense in the state of Washington, despite the fact that a commission of
the Washington state legislature has been screening lawyers for use in capital
cases since 1988.36 The creation of the screening committee might easily have
quieted concerns about capital defense in the state. However, the actual perusal of
facts about capital defense lawyers in the state-notably that nearly a fifth of
capital defendants in Washington state in the last two decades were represented
by court-appointed lawyers who had been disbarred, or were later disbarred,
suspended, or criminally prosecuted--can work to counter the complacency that
the 1988 reform might have produced.
The third category of non-entrenching reform we call sunset provisions,
provisions that call for the evaluation of the success of proposed reforms after a
period of time. Such reforms may take the form of classic sunset provisions,
which require that a particular reform expire after a given period of time unless it
is affirmatively renewed. This strong sort of sunset provision may often be
undesirable in the death penalty context, because even modest reforms can require
Herculean efforts and split-second timing that would be impossible to reproduce
three, five, or seven years later. This strong sort of sunset provision should be
used only for reforms that seem to have a strong likelihood of legitimation, such
as the Texas plan to have a capital defendant's claim of mental retardation
decided by the sentencing jury after they have concluded that death is the
appropriate punishment. A weaker type of sunset provision would require that the
effectiveness of a particular reform be studied, that public hearings be held, or
simply that collected data be publicly reported at a date certain in the future. This
kind of reform prevents people, in the public and the legislature alike, from
considering a problem fixed and moving on. Rather, it creates a specific moment
in the future for further scrutiny and reflection.37
16 See Lisa Olsen, Capital Defense on the Cheap, THE SEALE POST-INTELLIGENCER,
Aug. 8, 2001, atAl.
37 Note that such a reconsideration would have been helpful in the context of state
proportionality review, which was touted by the Supreme Court in Gregg as an important
feature of the reformed Georgia statute. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 204-06 (1976).
Experience with, and study of, state proportionality review has shown it to be largely ineffectual
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This trio of anti-legitimating reforms might not reform capital punishment in
and of themselves; rather, they plant the seeds for future reform or abolition and,
thus, are goals on which reformers need to spend some of their precious political
and material resources, even as they pursue other, more direct means of reforming
the worst aspects of our system of capital punishment.
IV. CRITQUES
In addition to useful debate about whether our three nominees for counter-
legitimating reforms are as promising as we suggest, there are a number of more
global critiques one could make to the arguments advanced above. We can
identify five major ones. First, one could question the descriptive premise, both of
our earlier work on judicial reform and of this essay on legislative reform, that
reform of either kind has had or is likely to have a significant legitimating or
entrenching impact. On the judicial front, we argued that the constitutional
regulation of capital punishment played a significant role in entrenching the death
penalty over the last three decades. One could argue instead that this
entrenchment was due entirely to crime rates because as crime rates, especially
homicide rates, rose precipitously in the 1970s and 1980s, support for the death
penalty rose as well. After crime rates, including homicide rates, fell precipitously
in the 1990s, support for the death penalty also fell. The lowest support recorded
in the last century for capital punishment was in 1966 and the highest was in
1994.38 The crime rates story is not a perfect fit (because crime rates were rising
before 1966 and falling before 1994), but after allowing for some lag-time, the
relevance of crime rates to support for capital punishment seems plausible.
Crime rates, however, do not tell the entire story. If crime rates were all that
drove public attitudes about capital punishment, then one would expect to see
both a tighter fit, time-wise, and some suggestion by the public themselves about
the source of the change in views. But, as we noted above, people who oppose the
death penalty almost always point to the problems of unreliability and the
possible execution of the innocent, concerns that are more likely to be accounted
for by legitimation effects than by crime rates. We do not mean to suggest in a
reductionist fashion that legitimation is the whole story; rather, we mean only to
argue that legitimation and entrenchment are a significant part of the story of
public attitudes about capital punishment, albeit a part hard to isolate or quantify.
A second global critique might attack a different premise of our project. Our
as practiced, but there has never been an opportunity in the litigation context to develop this
point effectively. See Leigh B. Bienen, The Proportionality Review of Capital Cases by State
High Court After Gregg: Only "The Appearance of Justice"?, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
130, 133 (1996) ("After the United States Supreme Court held in Pulley v. Harris that
proportionality review was not mandated by federal constitutional principles, the majority of
state high courts reduced proportionality review to a perfunctory exercise.") (citations omitted).38 See Gallup Poll News Service, supra note 3.
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general argument that we should attend to legitimating and entrenching effects of
death penalty reform is premised on the idea that abolition is possible in the
foreseeable future. If one thought that complete abolition of capital punishment is
not now and, in the absence of profound political change, never will be a realistic
possibility in the United States, the legitimating and entrenching effects of reform
would be of only academic interest. Under these circumstances, it simply would
not be a question whether abolitionists should support legislative reform of capital
punishment. Rather, the only question would be which reforms to support, and
that question would be answered without reference to the problems of
legitimation and entrenchment. Our premise that abolition is possible, and more
possible now than at any other time since Furman, is untestable, but it receives
some small support from the growing discomfort our country is facing as the rest
of the Western industrialized world both abjures the death penalty and puts
pressure on the United States to either abandon the practice or forego its
leadership role in areas such as human rights.39
Third, a related critique accepts that legitimation and entrenchment are real
possibilities and that they might actually delay or prevent the achievement of a
readily-achievable abolition but states that it is simply a moral imperative to limit
the death penalty (to save lives) when we can, and thus, all political capital must
be spent in this way. This tends to be the critique offered most frequently from the
capital defense bar, which works case-by-case in the trenches. They are
abolitionists, but they are steadfastly averse to making conscious choices in favor
of long-term strategy over present cases and lives. Our answer to the capital
defense bar is that, as advocates for individual clients, they must never trade a
client's interest toward some future, greater gain. But as abolitionists, they must
have a long-term strategy that allocates some resources toward current cases and
some toward larger goals. The fact that life is at stake does not (or should not)
change this calculus.
From the entirely opposite direction, people on the far left might argue that
we should abandon the reforming process entirely and indeed, actively oppose it
because of its legitimating and entrenching potential. The only way to eliminate
the death penalty, the argument would go, is to let it decline as much as possible.
Let the children, those with mental retardation, and even the innocent, be
executed and then finally, we will have a real chance of abolishing the death
penalty. From this familiar, far left position of hoping that crisis will inspire
revolution, the answer to the question: "Should abolitionists support legislative
reform of the death penalty?" would be a resounding "NO." We need not discuss
the familiar, tangled debate on the morality of crisis politics to reject this critique,
39 See, e.g., Karen DeYoung, Amnesty Criticizes U.S. Record on Rights, THE
WASHINGTON POST, May 31, 2001, at A22 (noting that the head of the U.S. chapter of Amnesty
International chided the U.S. for 'abdicat[ing] its duty' to lead the world in promoting human
rights").
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because it simply is not practical in the context of the politics of death-penalty
reform. The impetus for, and success of, legislative reform of capital punishment
generally comes from, and will continue to come from, supporters of capital
punishment who seek to reform the practice in order to preserve it. Opposition to
any kind of reform from individuals on the far left would be transparently
political and wholly unavailing.
Finally, a different sort of critique from the left might claim that we do not
take our legitimation argument far enough or seriously enough. If we actually
achieved the ultimate goal that we set for ourselves, the wholesale abolition of
capital punishment, we would only legitimate the rest of our diseased and
discriminatory criminal justice system. Capital punishment is the only thing that
keeps public attention focused on the abuses of our criminal justice process;
eliminate the death penalty and the problems of incompetent lawyers, disparate
racial impact, and the convictions of the innocent will sink from public view and
concern. This last critique is both the strongest and the weakest. It is powerfully
true that the death penalty focuses public scrutiny on our deeply flawed criminal
justice system, and that it will be harder to get people to notice or care about
injustice in the system without the dramatic fear of the execution of the innocent.
However, the most common response of those concerned by problems in the
capital trial and sentencing process is not to propose across-the-board reforms of
the process as whole, but rather to target capital cases, often at the expense of
non-capital cases. Moreover, even if some of the reforms brought about by
concern over capital cases help to promote criminal justice in non-capital cases as
well, the price of tolerating executions is simply too high. There are other ways of
promoting reform of the criminal justice process to which abolitionists, or at least
some of them, would turn if the death penalty were abolished.
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